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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  paper  adds  to  the existing  literature  on the  determinants  of government  spending  in Research  and
Development  (R&D)  by considering  the role  of  strategic  interactions  among  countries  as  one of  the pos-
sible  competing  explanations,  within  a spatial  econometric  framework.  We  account  for  several  factors
affecting  national  levels  of  public  R&D  spending,  including  (i)  the  international  context  – i.e. Lisbon  strat-
egy;  (ii)  country  characteristics  – level  of  private  R&D,  GDP,  trade  openness  and the  National  System  of
Innovation;  (iii)  countries’  similarities  in  relation  to (a)  trade  and  economic  size  and  (b)  sectoral  spe-
cialization.  The  analysis  is carried  out on  14  European  countries.  First,  we ﬁnd  that  factors  traditionally
affecting  the  level  of public  R&D  expenditure,  such  as  the  scale  of the  national  economy,  trade  open-
ness,  sectoral  specialization  and  private  R&D,  signiﬁcantly  inﬂuence  the  level  of public  R&D  in  Europeaneywords:
ublic R&D expenditures
trategic interactions in public spending
ational Systems of Innovation
rivate R&D
countries  between  1994  and  2006.  Interestingly,  the introduction  of  the  Lisbon  strategy  does  not  seem
to  have  affected  changes  in  the  levels  of  public  R&D  spending.  Second,  by  using  different  weight  matri-
ces,  we  conﬁrm  the  existence  of  strategic  interactions  in  relation  to  R&D  spending  among  European
countries  with  similar  economic,  international  trade  and  sectoral  structure  characteristics,  though  not
 2014
U countries
patial dynamic panel data
geographically  close.
©
. Introduction
The existing literature on tax competition almost unanimously
oncludes that countries strategically compete on public expendi-
ure to attract (or avoid the migration of) ﬁrms or multinational
orporations that are seeking a favorable environment to locate
heir activities (Case et al., 1993; Figlio et al., 1999; Baicker, 2005;
edoano, 2003, 2007). However, although ﬁrms often claim that
ublic R&D is an important factor affecting their decision to locate
n a particular area, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no empir-
cal contribution that tests the strategic interactions in government
pending among countries as one of the several possible determi-
ants of public R&D spending.
∗ Corresponding author at: SPRU, Science and Technology Policy Research, Jubilee
uilding, University of Sussex, Falmer Brighton BN1 9SL UK.
el.: +44(0)1273 877139.
E-mail address: M.Savona@sussex.ac.uk (M.  Savona).
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We ﬁnd this gap in the public choice literature somewhat puz-
zling, given the European Commission’s (European Commission,
2004) emphasis on the Lisbon Strategy and the debate over the so-
called ‘European Paradox’ (Dosi et al., 2006). The Lisbon strategy
sets goals for innovation performance by EU countries explicitly
based on public spending on R&D. There is a large body of empiri-
cal evidence showing that the higher the expenditure on R&D, the
higher the competitive advantage due to innovation, and the higher
are national growth rates. Public R&D is therefore likely to be used
by governments as a strategic tool to improve the competitiveness
of countries and attract mobile tax bases within their boundaries.
However, public R&D expenditure is a very speciﬁc item of pub-
lic spending policy that is likely to be linked to a more complex set
of factors than only competition among countries. The aim of this
paper is to contribute to the existing literature on public choice by
testing – within the same framework – the role of traditional fac-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.tors affecting public R&D spending and the relevance of competing
explanations such as the existence of strategic interactions among
the EU-15 countries.1
1 In this paper we focus on government R&D spending and not the R&D effort
by  the business sector, as explained in Section 3.1. Further, we  do not consider the
 license.
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To this purpose, we ﬁrst review a selection of the existing lit-
rature on factors that drive policy makers’ choices related to
&D expenditure, and might explain strategic interactions in such
hoices. Part of the rationale of the Lisbon strategy is the desirabil-
ty of a certain level of convergence among countries’ public R&D
pending on the basis of the evidence referred to above. From a
eaction function perspective, a neighbor with higher levels of R&D
xpenditure might be in a more favorable position to attract ﬁrms
r foreign direct investment (FDI). On the other hand, a neighbor
ith weaker R&D intensity might impede possible R&D spillovers
hat would beneﬁt both countries. In either case, it is important to
nvestigate the determinants of different countries’ behaviors and
xpected outcomes in terms of convergence/divergence in public
&D spending decisions. We  believe that it is important to exam-
ne these issues from both a reaction function and a system of
nnovation perspective.
This paper combines work on spatial and strategic interaction
n public choices with contributions that focus on the motivations
or and debate around public expenditure on R&D, to test whether
here are strategic interactions in decisions related to the amount of
U countries’ R&D expenditure. Our conjecture is that, in addition to
actors traditionally affecting public expenditure, such as the scale
f the national economy and trade competitive advantage, public
xpenditure on R&D is the result of speciﬁc national characteristics
dentiﬁed in the literature as the National Innovation System (NIS).
ne of the elements of the NIS is the similarity of countries’ sec-
oral structure. While NIS and sectoral specialization arguments are
ommon in the innovation literature, their application to a spatial
nteraction framework is less well explored. We  provide evidence
n the extent to which similar sectoral and technology structures
nd private (aggregate) R&D expenditure determine similar trends
n public R&D spending decisions.
We test the existence of spatial interactions related to public
&D expenditures for 14 European countries using panel data for
he period 1994–2006. We  employ a maximum likelihood tech-
ique on a balanced panel dataset and use different spatial matrix
peciﬁcations, which account for the speciﬁcity of public R&D
xpenditure. First, we ﬁnd that factors traditionally affecting public
xpenditure, such as scale of the national economy, trade open-
ess, sectoral specialization and private R&D signiﬁcantly affect
he level of public R&D spending by European countries between
994 and 2006. However, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of
he Lisbon strategy, nor of the level of public R&D in the US and
apan. Second, we show that the proximity of European countries
rom an economic and trade perspective tends to be associated
o similar trends in public R&D expenditure. Third, the estima-
ion results conﬁrm the presence of strategic interactions in public
&D spending, among European countries with the same sectoral
nd technological innovation structures, supporting evidence on
omplementarity and spillovers between public and private R&D
xpenditures across similarly specialized countries. In contrast to
ost of the spatial econometric literature, we ﬁnd that geographic
roximity does not matter for public spending on R&D by European
ountries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
iterature and justiﬁes the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents
he empirical model and the econometric issues arising from its
mplementation. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the estima-
ion results. Section 5 concludes.
ndirect public support to ﬁrms, in the form of tax credits on private R&D, which has
lready been tackled by several existing contributions (see e.g. Bloom et al., 2002;
ilson, 2009 among others). Here we implicitly focus on the direct support to the
rivate sector stemming from the activity of publicly funded R&D conducted in the
ublic sector.licy 43 (2014) 1217–1226
2. Background literature
2.1. Strategic interactions in public policy
A number of empirical studies show the relevance of the theo-
retical literature on strategic interactions related to ﬁscal or public
expenditure decisions (for an empirical survey, see, e.g. Brueckner,
2003). Generally, observed public ﬁscal decisions in one region
positively depend on public ﬁscal choices in neighboring or com-
peting regions, leading to the conclusion that public choices are
strategic complements. These empirical results emerge from data
for the US states and Canadian provinces (e.g. Brett and Pinske,
2000 for Canada, and Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001 for the US)
and European subnational government datasets (e.g., Heyndels and
Vuchelen, 1998, for Belgium; Buettner, 2001, for Germany; Feld
and Reulier, 2005, for Switzerland; Bordignon et al., 2003, for Italy;
Solé-Ollé, 2003, for Spain, and Charlot and Paty, 2007, for France). A
few contributions estimate reaction functions for taxes using OECD
country datasets (see Besley et al., 2001; Devereux et al., 2002;
Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002).
A series of factors might explain interactions among govern-
ments: these include tax competition (see Wilson, 1999 for a
survey); spillover beneﬁts (see e.g. Wilson, 1996); welfare competi-
tion (Brueckner, 2000) and yardstick competition (Besley and Case,
1995a,b). Public choices are conﬁned within national boundaries,
though partly depend on what neighboring states decide over time.
Reaction functions have been estimated mainly for taxes, although
an increasing number of contributions deal with reaction functions
for public expenditures, in some cases within a spatial econometric
framework (Brueckner, 2003). Case et al. (1993), Figlio et al. (1999),
Baicker (2005) and Redoano (2003, 2007) explicitly focus on public
expenditure.
However, most of this work is based on US  data. For instance,
Case et al. (1993) estimate the effect of a state’s spending on that
of its neighbors using a spatial lag model. They ﬁnd that a state’s
per capita expenditure is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated
with neighbor states’ spending. These results are conﬁrmed by
Figlio et al. (1999), who  check the existence of spillovers in welfare
spending. Baicker (2005) ﬁnds that each dollar of national spending
leads spending in neighboring states to increase by between 37 and
88 cents. Redoano (2003) estimates reaction functions for (aggre-
gated and disaggregated) taxes and public expenditure using data
on the EU countries for the period 1985–1995. She ﬁnds that gov-
ernments behave strategically with respect to spending items that
are more directly comparable, such as education: an increase of 1
dollar in the amount spent on education by neighbors increases
expenditure on the same item in the focal country by more than
40 cents.
Interdependency in public policies might also be due to yard-
stick competition. To avoid alienating voters and the risk of not
being reelected, incumbents imitate each other. Again, it is difﬁcult
to deﬁne a priori with whom voters compare their incumbents.
As information on politics’ decisions taken in geographically close
countries is likely to be more easily accessible, interactions are
likely to happen among neighboring countries. However, voters
may  also compare other relevant neighbors, i.e. countries that are
“close” in terms of economic environment.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on strategic interac-
tions reviewed above does not deal with public R&D expenditure.
R&D spending decisions are part of long-term, structural public
policy at the intersection between science, innovation, industrial
and competition policies. Within the tax competition literature
framework, countries might compete on R&D expenditure in order
to attract (or avoid the migration of) ﬁrms or multinational cor-
porations that are seeking a favorable and knowledge-intensive
environment to locate their activities. However, as Ladd (1992) and
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In a seminal article, Pavitt (1984) linked technological
trajectories to the creation of different technological opportu-
nities, responsible for sectoral heterogeneity in the patterns ofH. Hammadou et al. / Resea
ase et al. (1993) argue, policy-makers are not necessarily inﬂu-
nced by geographic neighbors in making public decisions but are
ikely to compete with countries that are similar from an economic
erspective. Thus, the existence of “spatial” interactions should
e investigated in a broad sense using alternative deﬁnitions of
roximity based on geography, economics, international trade and
ectoral structure2. Considering that investors are likely to com-
are countries in terms of their economic environment to locate
heir activities, policy-makers may  imitate those speciﬁc countries
o avoid capital and ﬁrms’ migration. All in all, R&D is a very speciﬁc
tem of public spending policy that is likely to be affected by a more
omplex set of factors than only competition. We  address this issue
n the next section.
.2. Science policy in the EU: framing the debate
Public decisions on R&D spending are part of the broader
ational science policy. As a way of framing the debate around sci-
nce policy in the EU and identify the relevant factors affecting
overnments’ decisions on public R&D spending, we ﬁrst revert to
he so-called ‘European Paradox’, and the features of the EU-wide
cience and technology policy vis-a-vis that of the US and Japan
Section 2.2.1). We  then look at the empirical evidence on the deter-
inants of public R&D spending from a National Innovation System
NIS) perspective (Section 2.2.2). Among other factors, we  focus on
he sectoral structure of national economies, which may  be linked
o the demand for public support for innovation (i.e. a country with
 revealed specialization in high-tech sectors – ceteris paribus – will
pend more on R&D, which in turn will create political pressure for
ore public support for basic and applied research). This raises the
rucial issue (addressed in Section 2.2.3) of whether private and
ublic R&D are complements or substitutes, which is relevant to
nform science policy.3
.2.1. The logic of basic scientiﬁc research and the ‘European
aradox’
The Lisbon strategy (EU, 2004) is well established but continues
o provoke debate among science and technology policy scholars
nd practitioners, and has been the subject of numerous empiri-
al studies since it was ﬁrst announced (see among others, Nelson,
006; Dosi et al., 2006).
Public R&D and ‘basic research’ increase the stock of scientiﬁc
nd technological knowledge that in turn foster countries’ com-
etitiveness. However, as put forward by Nelson (2004)4 and Dosi
t al. (2006), not only scientiﬁc and technological knowledge result-
ng from public R&D are public goods, subject to uncertainty and
erendipity, but are likely to interact in a self-reinforcing way with
heir technological and industrial applications and be affected by
he behavior of private enterprises (Pavitt, 1987, 2001; Freeman,
982, 1994; Nelson, 2004, 2006).
Scholars who recognize the presence of a ‘European Paradox’
epict the European Science and Technology System (STS) – com-
ared to the ones in the US and Japan – as excellent in terms of basic
esearch, spurred mainly by public R&D spending and other pub-
ic support for business R&D (e.g. tax credit, public infrastructure),
lthough weaker in terms of its innovative applications, measured
sually as numbers of industry patents.
2 As a consequence, the effect of alternative interaction matrices should be empir-
cally tested to provide the relevant deﬁnition of neighbors.
3 For this purpose, and as mentioned above, we  are not interested in the indirect
ublic support to private R&D spending. The issue here is to investigate potential
rowding-out or positive spillover effects between public and private aggregate R&D
pending, which are not related to R&D tax credits.
4 A country’s “science base largely is the product of publicly funded research and
he knowledge produced by that research is largely open and available for potential
nnovations to use” (Nelson, 2004).licy 43 (2014) 1217–1226 1219
However, in ﬁerce opposition to the idea of a European paradox,
Dosi et al. (2006) argue that the EU STS lags behind both in terms of
scientiﬁc research5 and in relation to innovation output, showing
that the returns from EU R&D are lagging behind with respect to the
US and Japan.6 However, the evidence is not conclusive about the
existence – and importance – of a ‘European Paradox’, as it depends
on measurement and empirical issues.
The idea of a ‘European Paradox’ would be weakened by evidence
supporting an “imitative” behavior of EU governments in terms of
public R&D spending with respect to the US and Japan. This would
imply the perception of a gap in the EU national support to basic
research and explain the presence of spatial interactions. We  shall
test and discuss this in the empirical section.
2.2.2. Scientiﬁc and technological knowledge in the making: NIS
and sectoral structure
Before the concept of a European STS emerged – following the
implementation of the Lisbon strategy – there was a ﬂourishing
stream of literature on NIS, terminology used by Freeman (1987)7
(including Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997, 2005). The
NIS approach attempts to link systemic innovation performance
to national characteristics, including the coordination and perfor-
mance of public and private organizations and the institutions
involved in the creation and diffusion of knowledge for innovation.8
While traditional country characteristics, such as size, population
and GDP per capita, are relevant, the NIS approach posits that a
much wider set of features is responsible for innovative perfor-
mance, including ﬁrms, universities, public research centers, local
government and sectoral agencies.
There are three core constituents of the NIS (Freeman, 1987;
Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992) as historical cases show (Freeman,
1987, 2002), which explain governments’ decision on the level of
R&D spending:
(1) The different tools of countries’ public support for the inno-
vation process, such as grants, subsidies to ﬁrms and R&D tax
credits.
(2) The role of private organizations responsible for the creation of
knowledge at ﬁrm and sectoral levels, which also are represen-
tative of an integral part of the technological knowledge system
related to the application of basic science.
(3) The university system, which – although it varies across
countries – provides essential training for scientists and is
responsible for technological knowledge transfer to ﬁrms.
There is a stream of literature on university–industry linkages
(see Mowery and Sampat, 2005 for a review).95 According to Dosi et al. (2006) if public R&D shares are measured as percentage
of  GDP or per inhabitant, rather than share of total R&D expenditure, evidence of
an  EU paradox disappears. In the empirical analysis in this paper, we use per capita
R&D expenditure.
6 For an extensive review of the returns to R&D see Hall et al. (2010).
7 Actually, Freeman and Lundvall credited each other with being the progenitors
of  the concept of NIS.
8 For instance, both Lundvall (1992) and Edquist (1997) consider that the NIS
encompasses the entire national socio-economic system, in which cultural, eco-
nomic and political environment concur to determine the scale, direction and
success (or failure) of innovation activities (Freeman, 2002).
9 This literature proposes some additional issues related to NIS – academic sys-
tems and the effectiveness of university–industry linkages. We do not include these
in  the present analysis, which is linked to decisions about the amount of R&D spend-
ing rather than its different possible destinations.
1 rch Po
i
c
i
t
s
t
k
o
(
t
P
p
s
n
K
C
v
k
i
t
t
p
t
p
t
a
T
e
R
2
e
e
R
i
p
t
i
o
p
i
c
p
r
c
(
t
R
m
b
s
i
w
e
i
t
s
t
ﬁ220 H. Hammadou et al. / Resea
nnovation. Pavitt’s sectoral taxonomy10 has been very widely
ited, tested empirically for a variety of countries, and sparked
ntense debate (see Archibugi, 2001; Castellacci, 2009). Pavitt’s sec-
oral taxonomy is based on various characteristics, including ﬁrm
ize across sectors, technological opportunities, creation vs. adop-
ion of technology, types of vertical linkages and inter-sectoral
nowledge exchange among sectors (which includes the intensity
f R&D expenditure).
Castellacci (2009), building on contributions in the literature
Evangelista, 2000) extended Pavitt’s taxonomy to the services sec-
or and identiﬁed another category – the ‘Advanced Knowledge
roviders’ (AKP) – which resonates with Pavitt’s ‘specialized sup-
liers’, but adds the set of services sectors that provide highly
pecialized knowledge (information and communication tech-
ologies – ICT, private R&D, engineering, and consultancy) – or
nowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS) (see Miles, 2005;
iarli et al., 2012, for a recent review).
AKP – along with traditional science based sectors – are the pri-
ate counter-part to and the most likely intensive users of the public
nowledge base, which is a necessary condition for countries to
nnovate and compete. For the purposes of this paper, we  conjec-
ure that the presence and intensity of AKP is a core element of
he cross-countries similarity in terms of the main determinants of
ublic R&D spending, that is, sectoral specialization and intensity of
he knowledge base. The latter is linked closely to the ‘demand’ for
ublic support for innovation (i.e. national specialization in high-
ech sectors – ceteris paribus – requires higher spending on R&D
nd higher levels of public support for basic and applied research).
his leads us to our ﬁnal consideration within the debate on sci-
nce policy: that related to the links between public and private
&D spending.
.2.3. Public on private R&D: positive spillovers or ‘crowding out
ffect’?
A research area that is of ‘perennial policy relevance’ (David
t al., 2000, p. 501) is related to analysis of the effects of public
&D on private R&D investments at various level of analysis (ﬁrm,
ndustry, country), and also on whether private investments affect
ublicly funded or publicly performed R&D, in order to establish
he existence of complementarity. That is, whether public spend-
ng spillovers affect private ﬁrms’ decisions about R&D spending,
r whether public funds in the form of direct subsidies ‘crowd out’
rivate spending, that is are substitutes (David and Hall, 2000). This
s an important issue for policy, and is difﬁcult to disentangle at the
onceptual and empirical levels.11
While it is relatively straightforward to assess the impact of
ublic funding on private spending on R&D at the micro-level, this
elationship is more complex at more aggregate levels – and espe-
ially at the country level, the focus of this work. David and Hall
2000) model the factors affecting this relationship, such as rela-
ive size of the public R&D sector, elasticity of the supply of qualiﬁed
&D personnel, mix  of public support for private R&D projects, and
arginal rate of returns on private R&D. Another element that must
e taken into account is knowledge spillovers from publicly funded
cience to the private sector, over time. These knowledge spillovers
nclude publicly funded training of scientists, which most certainly
ould contribute to complementarity rather than crowding out
ffects (to the extent that private ﬁrms value either the direct train-
ng received by scientists, or the effects of a public science system
hat ﬁlters researcher quality).
10 This includes: science based sectors; specialized supplier, supplier dominated,
cale intensive and information intensive sectors. This last was a later addition to
he originally proposed taxonomy (Pavitt et al., 1989).
11 See David et al. (2000) for a review of the econometric evidence from, mostly,
rm  level studies.licy 43 (2014) 1217–1226
The country-level empirical literature on this topic is limited to
the US, with some notable exceptions (Levy, 1990; Von Tunzelmann
and Martin, 1998; David and Hall, 2000). Von Tunzelmann and
Martin (1998) provide panel data estimations of the effects of
changes in industry-ﬁnanced R&D compared to changes in govern-
ment expenditure, for 22 OECD countries for the 1969–1995 period.
They ﬁnd signiﬁcant and positive effects for only a quarter of the
countries included in the analysis. David et al. (2000) suggest that
the empirical literature so far is inconclusive about the comple-
mentarity or substitutability of public and private R&D. Although
there is slightly more evidence – especially from aggregate-level as
opposed to ﬁrm-level studies – supporting the presence of positive
spillovers from publicly funded R&D for private R&D investment,
in some cases a displacement effect within the two  has emerged.
By testing competing explanations of public R&D spending deci-
sions, including the intensity of AKP and the amount of private R&D
spending, our empirical analysis will also shed light on whether a
complementarity or substitutability link emerges between publicly
and privately funded R&D.
3. The empirical model
The aim of this paper is to assess the determinants of govern-
ment spending on R&D in 14 European countries. Our main original
contribution is in the inclusion of strategic interactions in govern-
ment spending among these countries as one of the several possible
competing explanations of public R&D spending. Accordingly, we
consider spatial dependence in a panel data framework. In line with
the literature (see, e.g., Devereux et al., 2002; Brueckner, 2003;
Dreher, 2006), we assume that a country’s policy reaction function
can be written as:
Zi,t = Ri(Zj,t, Xi,t),
where:
Zi,t is the vector of public expenditure in a country i at time t;
Zj,t is the vector of public spending in a set of other countries j
(j /= i) at time t;
Xi,t is the vector of the economic characteristics of country i at time
t.
We can replace the vector Zj,t by a weighted average, such as
wij × Zj,t which implies that every country responds in the same way
to the weighted average expenditures. The equation then becomes:
Zi,t = ˛i + WZj,t + ˇXi,t + εi,t (1)
We include several control variables in X, in line with the con-
siderations outlined in Section 2.2.
Among these variables, we  include private R&D. As mentioned
in Section 2.2.3, the existing empirical literature does not provide
a conclusive answer about the existence of complementarity or
substitutability between public and private R&D. The level of sig-
niﬁcance of the parameter will show if private R&D has an impact
on public R&D and the sign will show whether private and public
R&D are complements (positive sign) or substitute (negative sign).
As a covariate, we  also include the production value of Advanced
Knowledge Providers (AKP), as suggested by Castellacci’s (2009)
taxonomy. As argued above in Section 2.2.2, these industries are
characterized by a high technological capability and the ability to
create complex technological knowledge. We  expect that national
specialization in these high-tech sectors – ceteris paribus – requires
higher spending on R&D and higher levels of public support for basic
and applied research, therefore positively affecting the level of pub-
lic R&D. We  also include GDP p.c., to test whether macroeconomic
conditions have an impact on the level of public R&D expenditure.
rch Policy 43 (2014) 1217–1226 1221
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Fig. 1. Gross domestic expenditure on public R&D (euro per inhabitant).
Source: EUROSTAT, Science, Technology and Innovation indicators.
Fig. 2. European gross domestic expenditure on public R&D (euro per inhabitant)H. Hammadou et al. / Resea
e expect the sign of this latter coefﬁcient to be positive, since
ublic spending may  be used as policy tool to boost low economic
ctivity. Possible endogeneity problems for these three variables
re addressed (see below).
We will also include the level of trade openness as a possi-
le covariate. The trade openness index is calculated as the ratio
f country’s total trade, the sum of exports plus imports to the
ountry’s GDP. The higher this openness index, the larger the inﬂu-
nce of trade on domestic activities. Although a number of recent
apers have shown that trade openness has pro-competitive effects
eading to ﬁrm selection based on innovation,12 this is still a con-
roversial and open debate (see Tybout, 2003, for a survey). Other
ontributions support a negative relationship between trade open-
ess and public expenditure (e.g. Ferris and West, 1996; Ferris,
003; Borcherding et al., 2004). They argue that international inte-
ration inducing more tax competition and therefore less capacity
o increase taxes – such as capital tax – restrict the size of the public
ector and consequently public R&D spending. The expected sign is
herefore uncertain.
Further, we test for the possible impact of the Lisbon strategy.
e  use a dummy  that is equal to 1 for the years since 2001. There is a
arge economic literature showing that R&D can be a major advan-
age and increase countries innovation performance and growth.
herefore we can expect higher levels of public R&D in European
ountries after 2000 and the expected value for this parameter is
ositive.
We include the level of public R&D set by the US and Japan.
e test the hypothesis that public decisions made by these two
ountries inﬂuence public R&D in Europe, as it is implicit within
he European paradox debate. Expected values for the parameters
re positive.
Finally, individual ﬁxed effects are introduced to capture the
peciﬁc characteristics of each country over time.13
.1. Data and descriptive evidence
Data on public R&D are from national R&D surveys that com-
ly with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002) recommendations. R&D
tatistics include three main sectors of performance: Business
nterprise, Government and Higher Education.
In this study, we focus on public R&D expenditure, which refers
o government departments, institutes and other public bodies, as
ell as proﬁt and non-proﬁt organisations, ﬁnanced by central or
ocal government.14 The data for the EU-15 countries are from the
urostat database for the period 1994–2006. The unit of R&D expen-
iture is purchasing power standard per inhabitant, at constant
000 prices. Due to missing values for Luxemburg over our period
f study, we excluded this country from our data.15We  use a balanced panel data for the remaining 14 EU countries
or 1994–2006, which provides 168 observations. A panel data
pproach allows us to fully exploit the spatial and temporal dimen-
ions of the data.
12 Trade liberalization induces the least productive ﬁrms to exit the market and
he  most productive non-exporter ﬁrms to become exporters.
13 A summary of the variables included in the empirical analysis is provided by
able 1a, while Table 1b (both in the Appendix) reports the correlation coefﬁcients
mong the variables.
14 We are aware that the use of aggregate spending in R&D might undermine
ome of sectoral-speciﬁc aspects related to it. However, the framework in which
e  conduct the empirical analysis is one of aggregate reaction function. The sec-
oral dimension is accounted for both as an explanatory variable (AKP) and as one of
he  speciﬁcations of the distance matrix is countries’ proximity in terms of sectoral
pecialization.
15 We need to rely on a balanced panel data to use maximum likelihood techniques.in  2006.
Source: EUROSTAT, Science, Technology and Innovation indicators.
Fig. 1 shows the relatively low level of public R&D spending in
Europe compared to the US and Japan (see Section 2.2). The gap is
persistent over the 10 years from 1994 to 2004. The ﬁgure suggests
that the gap between the European countries and its main competi-
tors for R&D16 is a well-established phenomenon with structural
rather than cyclical causes; it suggests also that these structural
causes are still in place.
Fig. 2 shows the level of public R&D spending in 2006. We  cannot
exclude the possibility that there is strategic interaction, shown
by the spatial interdependence among the European countries for
public R&D. We test this econometrically.
16 We are aware that Europe’s potential competitors on public R&D expenditures
are  increasingly emerging countries like BRICS. However, we have decided to focus
on the US and Japan only, for simplicity and consistency with the debate on the
European paradox mentioned in Section 2.2.1. The strategic interaction on public
R&D spending between Europe and the emerging countries is of great interest and
is  part of our research agenda.
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4.1. Traditional explanatory factors
Let us start with the traditional factors that might explain the
level of public R&D. Using ML,  four explanatory variables (private
17 AKP include two sub-groups of industries: (1) in manufacturing, specialized sup-222 H. Hammadou et al. / Resea
.2. Econometric issues
Spatial dependence raises two econometric issues related to
q. (2) below. First, if countries react to the spending decisions
f other countries, then competing countries’ spending decisions
ill be endogenous and correlated with the error term (ε). OLS
ordinary least squares) yields a biased estimate of parameter 
Anselin, 1988). Second, if neighbors’ localities are subject to cor-
elated shocks, there is likely to be correlation among jurisdictions’
pending choices. The omission of spatially dependent explanatory
ariables may  generate spatial dependence in the error term, which
s given by the following equation:
i,t = Wεi,t + i,t (2)
If spatial error dependence is ignored, estimation of Eq. (1) might
rovide false evidence of strategic interaction.
Basically, two approaches exist to get consistent estimates of the
patial parameter  in Eq. (1). The ﬁrst one is based on maximum
ikelihood (ML) estimation. This method consists of a non-linear
ptimization routine, used to estimate the spatial coefﬁcient ,
aking into account the error structure in Eq. (2). The second one
s based on instrumental variables (IV) – two stage least squares
2SLS) method. In this paper, we will provide estimations results
sing ML  method, which does not require ﬁnding reliable instru-
ents.
Finally, we cannot exclude the hypothesis that there is some
ersistence in public R&D spending, which means that govern-
ent spending change only slowly over time (Devereux et al.,
002; Dreher, 2006; Redoano, 2007). However, including as an
xplanatory variable the time-lagged dependent variable (Zi,t−1)
n a spatial lag model remains a major issue using GMM  mod-
ls. Although serial correlation may  bias our results, we follow
he existing literature and mainly treat the presence of spatial
orrelation.
.3. Weight matrices
As suggested by Anselin (1988), an a priori set of interactions
using W)  should be deﬁned and tested. While a variety of weight-
ng schemes can be explored to allow different patterns of spatial
nteraction, a scheme that assigns weights based on Euclidean dis-
ance is frequent in the relevant empirical literature (Brueckner,
003). Therefore we use a geographical deﬁnition of neighborhood
ased on the Euclidean distance between jurisdictions. This scheme
s given by the weight matrix Wd and imposes a smooth distance
ecay, with weights wd
ij
given by 1/dij where dij is the Euclidean
istance between jurisdictions i and j for j /= i.
In our case, the degree of interdependence between two
ountries may  not depend on their geographic proximity, but on
heir relative economic size, the degree to which they are open
o international trade ﬂows, or the similarity of their structural
ectoral characteristics. We  investigate each of these possibilities
mpirically.
We deﬁne an interaction matrix WGDP such that higher weights
re assigned to countries with more similar economic characteristic
GDP per capita):
GDP
ij =
1
|GDPi − GDPj|
Following the work of Coe and Helpman (1995), we use intensity
f bilateral trade ﬂows (WBTF) as bilateral weights to approximate
he intensity of countries’ trade interdependences; more speciﬁ-
ally, we use the bilateral import shares (WBIS) of our set of 14
uropean countries. We  assume that the more intense the trade
inks between countries i and j, the greater will be the similaritylicy 43 (2014) 1217–1226
in innovation intensity among them (Cabrer-Borras and Serrano-
Domingo, 2007), and the more interdependent their public R&D
policies:
WBTFij =
Xij + Mij
Xi + Mi
and WBISij =
Mij
Mi
where Xij and Mij are respectively bilateral exports and import
shares.
Lastly, we introduce a third category of the weight matrix WAKP
to account for the speciﬁcity of public R&D expenditure. This weight
matrix is based on AKP, which are characterized by high (pri-
vate) R&D intensity and are leaders in the management of complex
technological knowledge.17 We  build on Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy
and extensions to it (Pavitt, 1989; Archibugi, 2001; Castellacci,
2009). Using Castellacci’s (2009) taxonomy, we identify the sec-
toral category AKP, in which private R&D is a typical core sector.
Our assumption is that policy-makers decisions about R&D spend-
ing are affected by the degree of specialization in their country
and those countries nearest to it, measured as intensity of AKP.18
In line with the literature reviewed in Section 2.2.3, we may  ﬁnd
that a degree of complementarity dominates over substitutability
between public and private R&D spending (David et al., 2000). An
ancillary assumption is that countries that are more specialized in
private R&D-intensive sectors exhibit higher public R&D spending.
We test the assumption that the more similar the intensity of AKP
between two countries i and j, the more interdependent will be
their public R&D policy:
WAKPij =
1
|AKPi − AKPj|
In line with the relevant literature, all the weight matrices are
standardized so that the elements in each row sum to 1.
4. Results
Our estimation strategy is as follows. First, we estimate Eq. (1)
using OLS without taking into account the possible effect of the
expenditure levels set by other countries ( = 0). We performed
the appropriate non-robust and robust spatial tests based on the
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) using every weighting scheme. The robust
tests indicate the presence of spatial lag dependence only, for all
weight matrices except for Wdist. Tables 1 and 2 show these esti-
mations results.
Second, given this result, we estimate the model in Eq. (1) using
ML method when including every weighting scheme except Wdist.
Country ﬁxed effects are included. Table 3 displays these estima-
tion results using each weighting scheme. To take into account the
possible endogeneity of GDP, trade openness, private R&D and sec-
toral specialization (AKP), we  lagged these covariates by one period.
Column 1 in Table 3 exhibits within estimates when no spatial lag
parameter is included. Since OLS estimations are biased, we  will
focus on the estimations results derived by ML  in Table 3.pliers of machinery, equipment and precision instruments; (2) in services, providers
of  specialized knowledge and technical solutions e.g. software, R&D, engineering and
consultancy (KIBS).
18 The variable AKP is measured as the production value of the sector expressed in
millions of euros (2000).
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Table  1
Estimations results (OLS).
Variables Estimates
Private R&Dt−1 p.c. 0.278***
(4.609)
Lisbon −0.023
(−0.170)
U.S. pub. R&D p.c. −0.470
(−0.751)
Jap. pub. R&D p.c. −0.096
(−0.104)
GDPt−1 p.c. 0.430
(1.175)
Openness indext−1 −0.541***
(−5.996)
AKPt−1 0.006
(0.532)
Constant 0.297
(0.067)
Observations 154
R-squared 0.499
t-Statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Dependent variable: E.U. public R&D p.c.
Table 2
LM test results (non robust and robust tests).
Weight matrix LM-LAG LM-ERR RLM-LAG RLM-ERR
Wd 14.63*** 16.02*** 0.04 1.43
(0.000) (0.000) (0.838) (0.231)
WGDP 4.57** 2.40 5.40** 3.23*
(0.033) (0.121) (0.020) (0.072)
WAKP 16.05*** 12.87*** 3.77** 0.59
(0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.444)
WBTF 12.00*** 8.74*** 5.90** 2.64
(0.000) (0.003) (0.015) (0.105)
WBIS 14.44*** 8.68*** 12.36*** 6.61
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.101)
p-Value in parentheses. (R)LM-LAG and (R)LM-ERR are (robust) non-robust tests.
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** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
&D, GDP, trade openness and sectoral specialization) have a sig-
iﬁcant impact on our dependent variable.
First, we ﬁnd a positive and very signiﬁcant parameter for pri-
ate R&D, suggesting the existence of complementarity between
ublic and private R&D. Let us note that this parameter remains
igniﬁcant whatever the speciﬁcation – including (or excluding)19
ny other weight matrix. Moreover, the signiﬁcance of private R&D
s not affected by the inclusion of the matrix based on sectoral
pecialization (WAKP).
Second, the trade openness index exhibits a signiﬁcant and neg-
tive sign. The signiﬁcance of trade openness as a direct covariate
s not inﬂuenced by the inclusion of any of the two  matrices based
n trade WBIS and WBTF (see columns 7 and 9 in Table 3). Here we
ontribute to the controversial empirical literature on the relation-
hip between trade openness and public spending, suggesting that
nternational integration involves more tax competition between
ountries and, therefore, less capacity to increase taxes and public
pending.
Third, the coefﬁcient associated with GDP is signiﬁcant and pos-
tive. Again, the signiﬁcance of GDP as a direct covariate is not
nﬂuenced by the inclusion of the weight matrix based on GDP (see
olumn 3 in Table 3). This outcome may  indicate that public R&D is
19 See column 1 in Table 3.licy 43 (2014) 1217–1226 1223
higher when macroeconomic conditions improve and is not used
as a tool of public policy by governments to boost low economic
activities.
We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the AKP variable
(although only signiﬁcant at 10% in columns 2, 5, 7 and 9). Let us
also mention that this outcome is not due to a strong correlation
between private R&D and AKP (see the correlation coefﬁcient – 0.24
– in Table 1b). The estimation results seem to provide new evidence
supporting the complementarity between public spending and the
presence of the most innovative sectors.
European countries do not imitate R&D spending decisions by
leader countries such as the US and Japan. This seems to reject the
presence, or at least the perception, of a European paradox. We
should have found a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in case of a perceived
gap in public R&D spending between Europe and the US and Japan,
which would have led to an imitative behavior in terms of public
spending in R&D. Also, interestingly, the Lisbon strategy seems not
to have had an effect on the levels of public R&D across EU countries.
The absence of such an effect suggests that government spending in
R&D is a very sticky variable, most likely anchored to the (national)
structural explanatory variables that we have taken into account.
National science policy strategies, including decisions on R&D pub-
lic spending, do not seem to change abruptly as a result of policy
requirements at the European level, at least in the short-medium
term.
4.2. Geographic, economic and trade proximity
Let us turn now to the spatial interactions results. We  ﬁnd a
positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient associated with the weighted
average of competing countries’ public expenditures, based on four
of our ﬁve weighting schemes.
Weighting schemes based on distance (Wd) do not show any
strategic interaction in R&D expenditures, which means that Euro-
pean countries do not strategically interact with spatially close
countries when setting their R&D spending. This result is interest-
ing, as it rejects the common ﬁndings of the literature on strategic
interactions in public choice, which generally ﬁnds an impact of
geographical proximity on the amount of public spending on items
different than R&D. This conﬁrms that public R&D is special item
of public spending, which responds to a variety of more complex
country’s characteristics, as mentioned in Section 2.2.
Rather, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient associ-
ated with the weight matrix, which assigns higher weights to
countries with similar economic characteristic (GDP per capita).
This suggests that European countries with similar GDP levels, i.e.
similar economic sizes, tend to spend similar amounts on R&D per
capita.
We also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient using weight-
ing schemes, based on trade (WBTF) or import share (WBIS).
Proximity, deﬁned from a trade perspective (as in Cabrer-Borras
and Serrano-Domingo, 2007), tends to promote similar decisions
on R&D spending among the European countries.
4.3. Sectoral specialization and complementarity/substitution
between private and public R&D spending
We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient associated with
the weight matrix WAKP. Therefore, the estimations results using
the weighting matrix based on Castellacci’s (2009) typology of AKP
conﬁrm the existence of strategic interactions among European
countries with similar sectoral and innovation structures. This out-
come suggests that countries with similar sectoral specialization
make similar decision about public R&D spending.
It is interesting that European countries that are similar eco-
nomically and commercially display similar decisions related to
1224 H. Hammadou et al. / Research Policy 43 (2014) 1217–1226
Table 3
Estimation results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
W.  matrix – WGDP WGDP WAKP WAKP WBTF WBTF WBIS WBIS
Priv. R&Dt−1 p.c. −0.082 0.245*** 0.121*** 0.188*** 0.173*** 0.193*** 0.175*** 0.190*** 0.173***
(−0.807) (8.005) (3.334) (4.532) (4.142) (4.021) (3.940) (3.942) (3.865)
Lisbon  −0.021 0.033 −0.024 0.023 0.014 −0.020 −0.013 −0.028 −0.021
(−0.390) (0.336) (−0.307) (0.248) (0.151) (−0.189) (−0.139) (−0.267) (−0.217)
U.S.  R&D pc
R&D p.c.
−0.426 0.130 −0.045 −0.359 −0.285 0.239 −0.253 0.243 −0.244
(−1.359) (0.334) (−0.135) (−0.845) (−0.675) (0.513) (−0.574) (0.517) (−0.547)
Jap.  R&D pc R&D p.c. −0.167 −0.042 −0.761 −0.813 −0.800 −0.377 −0.600 −0.354 −0.573
(−0.394) (−0.066) (−1.431) (−1.298) (−1.290) (−0.540) (−0.929) (−0.503) (−0.876)
Opennesst−1 index −0.021 −0.331*** −0.241*** −0.415*** −0.378*** −0.353*** −0.349***
(−0.231) (−5.077) (−4.317) (−6.763) (−5.805) (−5.24) (−5.126)
GDPt−1 p.c. 0.749*** 0.518*** 0.716*** 0.666*** 0.182* 0.651*** 0.192*** 0.653***
(2.999) (2.787) (2.880) (2.684) (0.691) (2.520) (0.724) (2.494)
AKPt−1 0.005 0.014* 0.015*** 0.013* 0.031*** 0.014* 0.031*** 0.015*
(0.786) (1.683) (2.184) (1.645) (3.590) (1.707) (3.585) (1.730)
Spatial lag parameter 0.560** 0.726*** 0.585*** 0.592*** 0.675*** 0.622*** 0.666*** 0.611***
(10.537) (17.508) (13.235) (13.617) (15.670) (13.926) (15.302) (13.402)
R  sq. 0.138
Log lik. −190.3 −189.03 −184.5 −183.14 −199.8 −186.35 −200.7 −187.94
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Nependent variable: E.U. public R&D pc.
ublic R&D expenditure. This result supports the National Innova-
ion Systems approach, conﬁrming that sectoral specialization does
ffect the overall amount of public expenditure on R&D, driven by
he speciﬁc demands of sectors with different R&D intensity.
Overall, our results are in line with the small literature on pub-
ic spending interactions among European states. Redoano (2003,
007) observes the existence of strategic interactions among Euro-
ean countries using aggregated and disaggregated data on public
pending (defence, education, health). The results in our paper sup-
ort the conjecture that governments act interdependently when
hey formulate policy choices related to R&D expenditure. How-
ver, they are not necessarily inﬂuenced by geographic neighbors
n making R&D decisions but are likely to interact with countries
hat are close economically and from an international trade and
ectoral structure perspective. Thus, geographic proximity does not
eem to affect public R&D spending decisions.
. Concluding remarks
The paper has added conceptually and empirically to two dif-
erent streams of literature on the determinants of public R&D
pending: that on countries’ strategic interactions in public choice
nd the National Innovation System approach within the innova-
ion literature.
On the one hand, the literature on strategic interactions has
ever accounted for a speciﬁc item of public spending, R&D. Within
his framework, it is therefore important to investigate whether tra-
itional factors affecting tax or public spending competition among
ountries that are willing to attract (or avoid the migration of) tax-
ayers, voters, FDI or multinationals, also affect public decision in
&D spending.
On the other hand, science and innovation policy scholars have
ainly tackled the issue of the impact of public R&D spending
n innovation performance of countries. When considering the
eterminants of R&D policy, they have done so mainly from a NIS
erspective, which focuses on the interactions between private
rms and sectors, universities and government. Surprisingly, the
IS approach has – to the best of our knowledge – never consideredstrategic interactions as one of the several possible competing
explanations of public choice on the level of R&D spending.
This paper represents an original contribution from a two-fold
perspective. Conceptually, it has ﬁlled the gap characterizing the
two streams of literature by accounting for the speciﬁc role of
strategic interactions, along a series of traditional factors, affect-
ing a special item of public spending decision, R&D. From the
methodological point of view, the paper has shown that the use
of spatial econometric techniques is more robust than non-spatial
techniques for the purpose at hand.
The relevance of this conceptual and empirical contribution has
to be located within the debate on the European paradox, and in
general on the rationale of the Lisbon strategy, which is based on
the assumption that a certain degree of ‘convergence’ in the level
of R&D spending among EU countries is desirable. However, by
reverting to the NIS approach, we have highlighted that decisions
on public spending in R&D have to be explained also in terms of
national sectoral and technological structures, which represent the
‘demand’ for public support in R&D coming from the private sectors
(including private R&D). This implies that countries’ similarities
in levels of public R&D spending might be driven by similarities
in their sectoral structure rather than top-down European science
policy only, especially if this is conﬁned to countries’ levels of R&D
spending. This is conﬁrmed by the lack of signiﬁcance of the Lisbon
strategy dummy, which allows us to conclude that public spend-
ing in R&D is a much more persistent and structural item of public
choice.
From the strategic interaction perspective, we have found sup-
port to our conjecture that R&D is not comparable to traditional
items of public spending and, as such, national science policy is
affected by factors that go beyond traditional (i.e. distance-based)
strategic interactions to attract (or avoid the migration of) tax-
payers and ﬁrms. Interestingly, and in contrast with the empirical
strategic interaction literature, our results show that competition
based on spatial proximity is irrelevant in determining decisions of
a typical country to set a certain level of spending in R&D. How-
ever, we ﬁnd support to the existence of strategic interactions in
R&D spending among European countries with similar economic,
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Table  1a
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
E.U. public R&D p.c. 168 3.69 0.53 2.66 4.54
Lisbon dummy 168 0.58 0.49 0 1
Private R&D p.c. 168 5.28 0.96 2.65 6.67
U.S.  public R&D p.c. 168 4.54 0.08 4.45 4.66
Japan  public R&D p.c. 168 4.16 0.06 4.04 4.25
GDP  p.c. 168 9.97 0.22 9.31 10.46
AKP  168 11.81 3.02 0 14.65
Openness index 168 −0.25 0.38 −0.82 0.61
Table 1b
Correlation coefﬁcients.
E.U. public R&D p.c. Private R&D p.c. U.S. public R&D p.c. Japan public R&D p.c. GDP p.c. AKP Openness index
E.U. pub. R&D p.c. 1
Private R&D p.c. 0.554 1
(0.000)
U.S. pub. R&D p.c. 0.077 0.164 1
(0.344) (0.042)
Japan pub. R&D p.c. 0.088 0.218 0.574 1
(0.276) (0.007) (0.000)
GDP p.c. 0.355 0.606 0.586 0.604 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AKP  0.511 0.245 0.177 0.231 0.361 1
(0.000) (0.002) (0.028) (0.004) (0.000)
Openness Index −0.261 0.255 0.055 0.092 0.375 −0.392 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.494) (0.256) (0.000) (0.000)
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iote: The unit of R&D expenditure is purchasing power standard per inhabitant, at
uros  (2000). All variables are in log except Lisbon dummy.
-Value in parentheses.
rade and sectoral structure characteristics, especially the intensity
f AKP sectors and private R&D.
These results offer general support to the NIS approach. The his-
orical and cumulative aspects of NIS, such as sectoral and trade
pecialization and the intensity of private R&D, have emerged as
eing more relevant as determinants of science policy choices (in
heir form of public R&D spending) than explanations based on
ardstick competition.
Further, the results of our empirical analysis allowed us to draw
he following conclusions.
First, within the debate on the existence of a European paradox,
ur results rather show the presence of a two-way and cumulative
elationship between basic science and its technological applica-
ions. Accordingly, they support the arguments put forward by
cholars who are skeptical of the existence of a European Paradox
nd hypothesize instead structural weakness of both the EU basic
cience and the overall STS compared to its main competitors (Dosi
t al., 2006). Also, we ﬁnd no impact of the US and Japan decisions
n national R&D spending: this weakens the presence, or at least
he perception, of a European paradox. A perceived gap in public
&D spending would most likely have driven an imitative behavior
f EU countries toward the US and Japan, which does not emerge.
Second, we ﬁnd that the not only sectoral and trade specializa-
ion of countries in private AKP explain public R&D spending (Pavitt,
984; Castellacci, 2009), but also that cross-countries similarities in
ectoral, technological and trade structures is responsible for their
imilarities in public R&D spending.20
Third, within the debate on public/private R&D complementar-
ties, our results support the presence of complementarities rather
han substitutability between public and private R&D investments,
gain offering overall support to the NIS approach, which relies
20 This has emerged from the comparison of spatial and non-spatial econometric
echniques, and might open up a whole new line of investigation within both the
nnovation and the public strategic interactions literatures.ant 2000 prices. AKP is the production value of the sector expressed in millions of
on the synergic interactions between public and private actors to
provide an innovation-fertile environment for ﬁrms. Overall, this
offers reasons to reﬂect on the whole rationale of the Lisbon strat-
egy and puts in perspective the panacea role of public R&D only,
if not supported by attention to sectoral structure and a sensible
industrial policy.
Future research would certainly add to the present contribution
in two  directions: ﬁrst, by considering separately speciﬁc public
R&D items such as government and higher education R&D, to inves-
tigate the role of publicly funded universities, again within a NIS
perspective. Second, by enlarging the number of EU countries con-
sidered here, compatible with data availability, and considering the
role that BRICS countries increasingly have in the global production
of R&D.
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